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The global Covid-19 health crisis that erupted in early 2020 has triggered a sharp contraction in 
worldwide real activity. This paper studies the response of Euro Area (EA) GDP and inflation to 
the Covid crisis. The Covid epidemic is a very large and truly unexpected and exogenous 
disturbance. This distinguishes Covid from standard macro shocks in “normal” times. Due to its 
huge size, the Covid shock is likely to have dominated other macroeconomic disturbances in 
2020-21. Thus it is plausible that macroeconomic developments, in 2020-21, were mainly caused 
by Covid. Covid thus provides a unique laboratory for analyzing the determination of real 
activity and prices in the face of a large exogenous disturbance. Understanding the transmission 
of exogenous disturbances is, e.g., important for designing effective policy responses. A vast 
(and growing) literature has analyzed the economic repercussions of Covid.
1
 Early studies on the 
macroeconomic effects of Covid include Eichenbaum et al. (2020) who incorporated an 
epidemiological model into a Real Business Cycle framework; and Guerrieri et al. (2020) and 
Pfeiffer et al. (2020) who considered New-Keynesian models.  
The contribution of the present paper is to provide simple analytics of the macroeconomic 
transmission of Covid, using a stylized New Keynesian model. An important feature of the 
analysis here is that it compares the adjustment to the Covid shock in a liquidity trap, i.e. a 
situation in which the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint for the nominal interest rate binds, to 
adjustment when the ZLB constraint does not bind. The framework is used to assess the relative 
role of aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) shifts, during Covid. The use of a 
liquidity trap model is motivated by the fact that Covid hit the EA (and other advanced 
economies) in a situation of persistently ultra-low interest rates. With monetary policy interest 
rates at the zero lower bound (ZLB), the central bank cannot stimulate real activity by lowering 
the policy interest rate.
2
 AS shifts are modeled as total factor productivity (TFP) shocks, while 
AD shifts are modeled as shocks to the household subjective discount rate.   
As documented below, Covid induced a reduction of EA GDP of about 7.8% in 2020, but 
Covid only had a negligible effect on inflation. The model suggests that the macroeconomic 
situation under Covid must be interpreted as the outcome of joint AD and AS shocks, whose 
                                                            
1 The IDEAS/RePec database lists approx. 15000 economic research papers related to Covid [May 2021].  
2 Liquidity traps have also been considered in a small number of other macroeconomic studies of Covid, however, 
the focus of those studies is different. For example, Fornaro and Wolf (2020) use an endogenous growth model of a 
liquidity trap to highlight possible adverse long-term effect on productivity (‘scarring’); Pfeiffer et al. (2020) and 
Clemens and Roeger (2021) use rich quantitative models with a ZLB to analyze fiscal policy responses to Covid.   
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offsetting effects stabilized inflation. The muted response of inflation indicates that Covid did 
not affect the output gap, so that the Covid-induced contraction of GDP corresponds to the 
contraction that would have obtained in a flex-price economy. The model suggests that Covid 
amounted to a 7.8% drop in EA TFP during 2020; this AS disturbance was accompanied by a fall 
in the subjective rate of time preference, that stabilized the natural real interest rate.  
The size of the concomitant model-inferred AD and AS shocks that reproduce the actual 
GDP contraction of 2020, at an unchanged inflation rate, is invariant to the persistence of these 
shocks, and to other model parameters.  
However, the model-inferred relative contribution of AD vs. AS shocks to the GDP 
contraction, in a liquidity trap, is sensitive to the assumed shock persistence. When the Covid-
induced AD and AS shifts are assumed very transient, the liquidity trap model attributes the 
Covid GDP contraction to a fall in AD (low household demand). However, the (predicted) slow 
recovery of EA output in 2021 indicates that the adverse AD and AS shifts induced by Covid are 
persistent (annual autocorrelation: 0.6). Under realistic shock persistence, the liquidity trap 
model attributes the Covid output contraction in 2020 to the negative effect of Covid on AS. 
However, AS and AD shifts mattered equally for the observed stability of inflation. In a liquidity 
trap, persistent negative AS shifts lower inflation, while persistent adverse AD shifts raise 
inflation. If Covid had solely affected AS, the EA would thus have experienced a sharp fall in 
inflation and a contraction in GDP that would have been deeper than the actual contraction, 
according to the liquidity trap model; that model suggests that the contraction in AD had a 
stabilizing effect on EA GDP during the Covid crisis.   
Interestingly, a model version that abstracts from the ZLB constraint (and assumes that 
the central bank sets the policy rate according to a Taylor rule) produces the same estimates of 
the Covid-induced AD and AS shifts, as the liquidity trap model. In that no-liquidity-trap model 
version, the Covid output contraction is unambiguously interpreted as an AS shift (irrespective of 
shock persistence).  However, a model version without ZLB constraint predicts that if Covid had 
solely affected AS, the EA would have experienced a sharp rise in inflation and a contraction in 
GDP that would have been smaller than the actual contraction.  
 Section 2 presents empirical evidence on the EA macroeconomy during Covid. Sect. 3 
presents the model. Sect. 4 interprets the EA macroeconomy during Covid through the lens of 
the model. Sect. 5 concludes.  
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2. The EA macroeconomy under Covid 
Table 1 reports predicted and realized annual EA macro variables for the years 2019-2021, as 
published by the European Commission (EC) in its November 2019 and May 2021 Economic 
Forecasts (European Commission (2019, 2021)).
3
 Cols. (1)-(3) are predictions for 2019-2021 
taken from the EC November 2019 forecast.
4
  Col. (4) shows predictions for 2021 from the May 
2021 Forecast. Cols. (5),(6) show actual (realized) variables for 2019 and 2020, respectively (as 
reported in the May 2021 Forecast). Cols. (7),(8) show pre-Covid forecast errors, i.e. the 
difference between actual variables in 2019 and 2020 and the corresponding EC predictions 
made in Nov. 2019. Finally, Col. (9) shows forecast revisions, between Nov. 2019 and May 
2021, for 2021 variables.  
 The forecast errors for 2019 variables  (Col. (7)) are very small, but the forecast errors for 
2020 variables (Col. (8)) are substantial, and so are the forecast revisions for 2021 variables (Col. 
(9)).  I interpret the forecast errors for 2020 variables, and the forecast revisions for 2021 
variables, as (largely) reflecting the effect of Covid. Due to its large size and unexpected nature, 
the Covid shock is likely to have swamped the effect of other unexpected disturbances in 2020 
(as argued above).   
 In November 2019 the European Commission predicted EA GDP (Y) and private 
consumption (C) growth rates (year-on-year, y-o-y) and inflation (π) for 2020 of 1.2%, 1.2% and 
1.5%, respectively (see Col. (1), Table 1).  Actual 2020 growth rates/inflation were -6.6%, -8.0% 
and 1.5%, respectively (Col. (6)). Thus the realized growth rates of EA GDP and consumption in 
2020 were 7.8 and 9.2 percentage points (ppt) below predicted values (Col. (8)). By contrast, 
realized EA inflation in 2020 equaled predicted inflation.   
Between the November 2019 and May 2021 forecasts, we note a +3.1% revision of y-o-y 
predicted GDP growth for 2021 (Col. (9)). That forecast revision amounts to a  -4.7% revision in 
the predicted level of 2021 GDP.
5
 Thus, Covid is predicted to have a persistent negative effect on 
the level of future GDP. By contrast, we notice only a very small revision in 2021 inflation:         
-0.3% (Col. (9)).   
                                                            
3 The EC Economic Forecast is published twice a year (spring and autumn).  
4 Statistics for 2019 shown in Col. (1) are predictions, as these statistics were published before the end of 2019. 
5
 The level of 2021 GDP predicted in the May 2021 EC forecast falls short by 4.7 ppt of the GDP level that would 




These are the key empirical observations that the theoretical model below will address. In 
summary: Covid triggered a sharp contraction of GDP that is predicted to be persistent; by 
contrast, Covid did not change inflation in 2020, and its effect on predicted 2021 inflation is very 
muted.  
Table 1 also reports predicted and actual growth rates of EA government consumption 
(G), investment (I), employment (L) and of labor productivity (Y/L) in 2020 and 2021; also 
shown is the actual and predicted (merchandise) trade balance/GDP ratio (NX/Y). Covid only 
had a very small effect on EA government consumption in 2020 (-0.2%), it depressed 2020 
investment by 9.2%, and it led to a slight trade balance improvement, +0.6 ppt (see Col. (8)). 
Thus, Covid had a combined effect on EA government consumption and the trade balance that is 
negligible compared to the large GDP contraction. The theoretical model discussed below will 
abstract from government consumption and foreign trade (a closed economy will be considered). 
The Covid-induced contraction of investment in 2020 was roughly of the same proportion as the 
contraction in private consumption; as the EA consumption/GDP ratio (about 55%) is much 
higher than the investment/GDP ratio (20%), the collapse in EA private consumption accounts 
for the bulk of the fall in EA GDP, in 2020. For analytical tractability, the theoretical model will 
abstract from physical capital and investment. 
 
3. Model economy 
A standard New Keynesian model is considered (e.g., Kollmann, 2001a,b, 2002, 2004, 2005, 
2008). The model assumes a closed economy with: a representative household; a central bank; 
monopolistically competitive firms that produce a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by 
s∈[0,1] using labor; competitive firms that bundle intermediates into a homogeneous final good. 
The household consumes the final good, supplies labor and owns all firms. The central bank sets 
the short-term nominal interest rate. Intermediate goods prices are sticky; all other prices and the 
wage rate are flexible. The labor market is competitive.  
 
3.1. The representative household 
The intertemporal preferences of the representative Home household are described by 
1 1/1
0 1 1/0





Ψ −∑  where tC  and tL  are final consumption and aggregate hours 
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worked at date t. 0 1β< <  is the household’s steady state subjective discount factor and 0η>  is 
the Frisch labor supply elasticity. 0tΨ >  is a stationary exogenous preference shock that alters the 
household’s rate of time preference. The household equates the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption to the real wage rate, which implies  
                                                           
1/(1/ )( / ) ( )tt t tC W P L
η= .                                                      (1) 
There is a market for a one-period riskless nominal bond (in zero net supply). The nominal 
interest rate on that bond is tr  between periods t  and 1.t+  The gross nominal rate is denoted 
1 .t tR r≡ +  The household’s Euler equation for this bond is:   
                                                     1 1 1( / )( / )/ 1,t t t t t t tR E C Cβ + + +⋅ Ψ Ψ Π =                                              (2) 
where 1 1/t t tP P+ +Π ≡  is the gross inflation rate between t  and 1.t+  If tΨ  follows a stationary 
AR(1) process, as assumed below, then a positive shock to the date t preference shifter tΨ  
lowers the expected subjective discount factor 1/t t tE β +Ψ Ψ  between dates t and t+1, and thus the 
shock raises the household’s subjective discount rate. In what follows, I will hence refer to the 
preference shock tΨ  as a (subjective) discount rate shock. A rise in tΨ  can be interpreted as a 
positive aggregate demand shock as, for a given real interest rate, it boosts desired current 




The final good is produced using the technology 
1
( 1)/ /( 1)
0
{ ( ( )) } ,t tY y s ds
ν ν ν ν− −≡ ∫  with ν>1, where tY  is 
date t final output. ( )ty s  is the quantity of type-s intermediate. Let ( )tp s  be the nominal price of 
that intermediate. Cost minimization in final good production implies ( ) ( ( )/ )t t t ty s p s P Y




{ ( ) }t t
s
P p s ds
ν ν− −
=
≡ ∫  is a price index for intermediate goods. Perfect competition implies that 
the final good price is tP  (its marginal cost).  
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The technology for producing intermediate good s is ( ) ( ),t t ty s L sθ=  where ( )tL s  is the labor input 
at date ,t  while 0tθ >  is an exogenous stochastic productivity parameter (identical for all 
intermediate good producers). tθ  is an aggregate supply shock.  
Intermediate good producers face quadratic price adjustment costs. The real profit, in 
units of final output, of the firm that produces intermediate good s is:   
                     
21
1 12
( ) ( ( ) / ) ( ) / ([ ( ) ( )] / ) ,t t t t t t t t ts p s W y s P p s p s Pπ θ ψ − −≡ − − ⋅ −Π⋅   0,ψ >  
where tW  is the nominal wage rate. The last term in this equation is the real price adjustment 
cost, where Π  is the steady state gross inflation rate. At date t, the firm sets ( )tp s  to maximizes 
the present value of profits ,0 ( )t t t tE sτ ττ ρ π
∞
+ +=∑ , where ,t t τρ +  is the household’s intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption between periods t  and .t τ+ All intermediate good 
firms face identical decision problems, and they produce identical quantities and set identical 
prices: ( )t tp s P=   [0,1].s∀ ∈  
 
3.3. Monetary policy 
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate tr , subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB) 
constraint 0,tr ≥  i.e. 1.tR ≥   
 
3.4. Market clearing  
Markets for intermediates clear as intermediate goods producers meet all demand at posted 
prices. Labor market clearing requires 
1
0
( ) .t t
s
L L s ds
=
=∫  Final good market clearing requires 
,t tC Y=  where t t tY Lθ=  is GDP.  
 
3.5. Solving the model 
I linearize all model equations around a deterministic steady state. Let  ( )/ttx x x x≡ −  denote the 
relative deviation of a variable tx  from its steady state value 0x ≠  (variables without time 
subscript denote steady state values). Using the market clearing condition t tC Y= , the linearised 
Euler equation (2) can be written as:   
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                                        1 1 1{ }.tt t t t ttR E Y Y+ + += Π + − +Ψ −Ψ                                               (3) 
Linearizing the first-order condition of the intermediate good firms’ decision problem 
gives a standard ‘forward-looking’ Phillips equation:   
                                            1 ,w tt ttmc Eκ β +Π = ⋅ + Π                                                            (4) 
where ( / )/t t t tmc W Pθ= is real marginal cost (deflated by the final good price) in the intermediate 
good sector (e.g., Kollmann, 2002). 0wκ >  is a coefficient that is a decreasing function of the 
price adjustment cost parameter .ψ  Using the nominal wage implied by the labor supply 
equation (1), and the conditions t tC Y=  and t t tY Lθ= , one can express real marginal costs as  
1 1/( / )t t tmc Y
ηθ += , which implies  
                                                            1 ( ).tt tmc Y
η
η θ
+= −                                                                 (5) 




Y θ= where FlextY  denotes GDP under flexible prices. Define the output gap tz   as the 
deviation of GDP from its flex-price level:  
                                               
Flex
t t tz Y Y≡ − .                                                                    (6)     
Using this definition, the Phillips curve (4) can be expressed as:  




+≡ ⋅                                               (7)            
while the Euler equation (3) can be written as  
          1 1{ } ,
nat
tt t t tt
R E z z R+ += Π + − +    with 1 1{[ ] [ ]}.
nat Flex Flex
tt t t t tR E Y Y+ +≡ − − Ψ −Ψ                    (8) 
nat
tR  is the risk-free gross real interest rate between dates t and t+1 (expressed in deviation from 
the steady state gross rate) that would obtain under flexible prices. I refer to 
nat
tR  as the natural 
real interest rate.   
The Phillips curve (7) implies that the output gap is a function of current and expected 
future inflation: 1 1{ }.tt t tz Eκ β += Π − Π  Substituting this expression into the Euler equation (8) 
gives:  
                                     
11
1 2(1 ) .
nat




+ += − Π + + Π − Π +                                         (9) 
I refer to (9) as the ‘Euler-Phillips’ equation.  
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Assume that TFP and the discount rate shock follow stationary univariate AR(1) 
processes with autocorrelations 0 1θρ≤ <  and 0 1ρΨ≤ < , respectively: 
                               11 1 1, ,t tt t t t
θ
θθ ρ θ ε ρ ε
Ψ
++ + Ψ += + Ψ = Ψ +                                                 
where  1 1,t t
θε ε Ψ+ +  are mean-zero innovations. Then, the natural real interest rate is given by 
                                  (1 ) (1 ) .
nat
t tt
R θρ θ ρΨ=− − + − Ψ                                                          (10) 
Thus, the natural real interest rate is a decreasing function of TFP and an increasing function of 
the discount rate shock. Note that 0 1θρ≤ <  implies that a positive shock to TFP lowers the 
expected future growth rate of TFP. In a flex-price economy, this entails a fall in the expected 
future growth rate of GDP and consumption, which lowers the natural real interest rate. A 
positive shock to the subjective discount rate between dates t and t+1 likewise raises the natural 
real interest rate between t and t+1.  
 
3.6. Liquidity trap  
This paper focuses on equilibria that obtain when the ZLB binds permanently, i.e. 1tR =  ∀t. A 
liquidity trap can, for example, arise when the central bank follows a Taylor-style interest rate 
rule. Then pessimistic household expectations about future inflation and GDP can push the 
nominal interest rate to the ZLB (Benhabib et al. (2001a,b), Kollmann (2021a,b)). The 
assumption of a permanent liquidity trap is solely made for analytical convenience. Kollmann 
(2021a,b) studies equilibria with self-fulfilling (expectations-driven) equilibria in which, in each 
period, the economy can escape from the liquidity trap with positive probability. When the 
escape probability from a liquidity trap is sufficiently small (i.e. when the liquidity trap is 
expected to last long), shock transmission is very similar to transmission in a permanent liquidity 
trap (Kollmann (2021a,b)).  
The motivation for analyzing the effect of Covid using a model with a liquidity trap is 
that Covid hit the EA (and other advanced economies) in an environment of persistently ultra-
low interest rates. The European Central Bank’s (ECB) policy rate has been at (or very close to) 
the ZLB since November 2013; a departure from this low-interest rate policy does not seem to be 
on the agenda of ECB decision makers, as of this writing. In normal times, the ECB would be 
10 
 




In a permanent liquidity trap, 0tR =  holds.
7
 The Euler-Phillips equation (9) then becomes  
                                          
11
1 20 (1 )
nat




+ += − Π + + Π − Π + .                                   (11) 
0<β<1 and κ>0 imply that one of the characteristics roots of this expectational difference is 
strictly larger than unity, while the other root is smaller than unity. This implies that equation 
(11) has multiple non-explosive solutions (Blanchard and Kahn (1980)). Following the liquidity 
trap models of Mertens and Ravn (2014), Roeger (2015), Arifovic et al. (2018), Aruoba et al. 
(2018), Kollmann (2021a,b) and de Beauffort (2021),  I  consider minimal-state-variable (MSV) 
equilibria in which inflation is a function of the contemporaneous fundamental forcing variables 
that drive the natural real interest rate, i.e. of TFP and the discount rate shock:  
                                                         ,ttt θλ θ λΨΠ = + Ψ                                                              (12) 
where θλ  and λΨ  are coefficients. Substitution of the inflation decision rule (12) and of the 
formula for the natural real interest rate (10) into the Euler-Phillips equation (11) gives:  
1 12 21 10 { (1 ) ( ) } { (1 ) ( ) } (1 ) (1 ) .t t t tt t t t
β β β β
θ θ θ θ θ θκ κ κ κ κ κλ θ λ ρ θ λ ρ θ λ λ ρ λ ρ ρ θ ρ
+ +
Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ= − + + − + − Ψ + + Ψ − Ψ − − + − Ψ  
 
This equation holds for arbitrary values of tθ  and tΨ  if and only if   
                                       (1 )/ ( )θ θ θλ ρ ρ= − Γ    and  (1 )/ ( )λ ρ ρΨ Ψ Ψ= − − Γ ,                                  (13) 
                                         with 
211( ) (1 )x x xβ βκ κ κ
+Γ ≡ − + + − .                                                   (14) 
It can readily be seen that ( ) 0xΓ <  holds for *0 x ρ≤ < , and ( ) 0xΓ >  for * 1,xρ < ≤ where 
*0 1ρ< <  is a root of the polynomial ( )xΓ , i.e. *( ) 0.ρΓ =  8  Thus,  
                                                            
6 The analysis here abstracts from unconventional monetary policies (such as Quantitative Easing, QE, or Negative 
Interest Rate Policy, NIRP) that have been conducted by the ECB since the global financial crisis of 2008-09. In 
March 2020, the ECB launched an asset purchases program (the “Pandemic Emergency Purchases Program”, PEPP) 
that aims to counter the economic effects of the Covid crisis. Hohberger et al. (2019), Kabaca et al. (2020) and 
Altavilla et al. (2021) show that unconventional ECB policies have, to some extent, acted as a substitute for 
conventional interest rate policy, during the period of ultra-low policy rates. Wu and Zhang (2019) show that the 
effect of US QE can be captured with a ‘shadow’ federal funds rate that is not constrained by the ZLB, and that  
follows a Taylor-type rule. Explicitly modeling unconventional monetary policy is beyond the scope of the simple 
framework used in the paper here. However, below I consider a model variant in which the nominal interest rate is 
not constrained by the ZLB to address the possibility that unconventional monetary policies acted as a substitute for 
conventional interest rate policy, during the Covid crisis.  
7 In an equilibrium with a permanent liquidity trap, R=1 holds in steady state. Linearization around the liquidity trap 
steady state thus implies 0
t
R =  ∀t.  
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             θλ <0, λΨ >0  holds for *,θρ ρ ρΨ< ;  and θλ >0, λΨ <0  holds for *, .θρ ρ ρΨ>          (15) 
This shows that a (sufficiently) transitory rise in TFP shock lowers inflation in a liquidity trap, 
while a persistent positive TFP shock raises inflation. A transitory positive discount rate shock 
raises inflation, while a transitory positive discount rate shock lowers inflation.  
 For intuition about the role of shock persistence for the response of inflation in a liquidity 
trap, consider the case where the autocorrelation of shocks is close to unity. Then 
1 2 ,t tt t tE E+ +Π ≈ Π ≈ Π  so that the Euler-Phillips equation (11) implies that 
nat
t tRΠ ≈ − , i.e. a fall 
in the natural real interest rate raises inflation. This explains why a persistent rise in TFP (that 
depresses the natural real interest rate; see (10)) triggers an increase in inflation. Similar logic 
explains why a persistent positive taste shock (that raises the natural rate) lowers inflation.  
 Conversely, when shocks are i.i.d., then a date t shocks does not affect expected future 
inflation, and the Euler-Phillips equation (11) implies .
nat
t tRκΠ =  Therefore, a purely transitory 
rise in TFP lowers inflation, while a transitory positive discount rate shock raises inflation.  
 Expected future inflation is  
                                                          .ttt tE θ θλ ρ θ λ ρΨ ΨΠ = + Ψ                                                 (16) 
 As the output gap is given by 1 1{ },tt t tz Eκ β += Π − Π  we find (from (12),(16)) that  
                                                1 1(1 ) (1 ) .tttz θ θκ κβρ λ θ βρ λΨ Ψ= − ⋅ + − ⋅Ψ                                       (17) 
Therefore, a persistent positive TFP shocks raises the output gap, while a transitory TFP increase 
lowers the output gap. Conversely, a persistent positive discount rate shocks lowers the output 
gap, while a transitory positive discount rate shock raises the output gap.  
Note that GDP is given by 
Flex
t t tY z Y= +   (see (6)). Thus, (17) implies    
                                          1 1[1 (1 ) ] (1 ) tttY θ θκ κβρ λ θ βρ λΨ Ψ= + − ⋅ + − ⋅Ψ .                                  (18) 
A persistent TFP increase (with *θρ ρ>  so that 0)θλ >  always raises GDP; a transitory TFP 
increase (with *)θρ ρ<  lowers GDP if prices are sufficiently sticky, i.e. when the slope of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
8  2 0.5* /2 {( /2) 1/ }a aφ β= − −  with (1 )/ .a β κ β≡ + +   
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Phillips curve κ is small. A persistent positive discount rate shock lowers GDP, while a 




3.7. Model solution without ZLB constraint (Taylor rule) 
It is interesting to compare shock transmission in the liquidity trap to transmission when the ZLB 
constraint does not bind, so that the central bank can adjust the policy rate, in response to 
disturbances. This Section abstracts from the ZLB and assumes that the central bank sets the 
short-term interest rate as a function of the inflation rate, according to a Taylor rule:  
                                                            ttR γ= Π ,  γ>1,                                                               (19) 
where the parameter γ captures the response of the policy rate to inflation. The ‘Taylor principle’ 
is assumed to hold (γ>1): a 1% rise in gross inflation triggers a rise in the gross policy rate by 
more than 1%.  
 When the monetary policy rule (19) applies, the Euler-Phillips equation (9) becomes  








+ +Π = − Π + + Π − Π + .                                  (20) 
The Taylor principle γ>1 ensures that both characteristic roots of (20) are large than unity (in 
absolute value), which ensures that (20) has a unique non-explosive solution of the form  
                                                            ,t ttθμ θ μΨΠ = + Ψ                                                          (21) 
where θμ  and μΨ  can readily be determined using the method of undetermined coefficients:   
                        (1 )/{ ( )}θ θ θμ ρ γ ρ= − − +Γ   and  (1 )/{ ( )}.μ ρ γ ρΨ Ψ Ψ= − − − +Γ                           (22) 
γ>1  implies that ( ) 0xγ− +Γ <  holds ∀ 0≤x≤1.  Thus, 0θμ <  and 0.μΨ >  GDP is now given by:  
                                         1 1[1 (1 ) ] (1 ) tttY θ θκ κβρ μ θ βρ μΨ Ψ= + − ⋅ + − ⋅Ψ .                                  (23) 
Away from the ZLB, a positive TFP shock lowers inflation, irrespective of the persistence of the 
shock; the shock raises GDP when the inflation coefficient of the Taylor rule γ is sufficiently 
large (which ensures that 0θμ <  is sufficiently small in absolute value, so that the coefficient of 
                                                            
9 (18) shows that a persistent negative TFP shock triggers an output contraction that is greater than the fall in TFP. 
Guerrieri et al. (2020) develop a multi-sector, incomplete-markets model in which a negative supply shock lowers 
output more than the shock; the authors refer to a supply shock with this feature as a “Keynesian” supply shock. The 
analysis here illustrates that “Keynesian” supply shocks arise in a standard liquidity trap model.  
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TFP in (23) is positive). Away from the ZLB, a positive discount rate shock raises inflation and 
GDP irrespective of shock persistence (provided γ>1).  
 
4. Interpreting Covid and the EA macroeconomy through the lens of the model 
This Section discusses model calibration, presents simulated shock responses, and interprets the  
adjustment of the EA economy to Covid in 2020-21 through the lens of the model.   
 
4.1. Estimating Covid-induced TFP and discount rate shocks 
As the data in Table 1 are annual, I use an annual model calibration.
10
 Covid was an unexpected 
event in 2020 that triggered persistent shifts in TFP and household preferences. I label the year 
2020 as t=0.  
Let tdx  denote the Covid-induced deviation of a variable tx  from its no-Covid trajectory 
in period t≥0. From (7), 1tt t td d z E dκ β +Π = ⋅ + Π  for t≥0. As documented above, Covid had zero 
effect on EA inflation in 2020, and a negligible effect on predicted inflation in 2021. Because of 
the muted effect of Covid on EA inflation, the model infers that the shock had (essentially) zero 
effect on the output gap: 0 0.d z =  This implies that 0 00 .
Flex
dY dY dθ= =  
  The model thus infers that, in the EA, the Covid event of 2020 amounted to a negative 
TFP shock: 
0
0.dθ <  From the model solution for inflation, in a liquidity trap (see (12), (13)), 
we see that 00 1 0d E dΠ = Π =  imply:  
                                    000 {(1 )/ ( )} {(1 )/ ( )}d dθ θρ ρ θ ρ ρΨ Ψ= − Γ ⋅ − − Γ ⋅ Ψ                                     (24)      
                           and 000 {(1 )/ ( )} {(1 )/ ( )} .d dθ θ θρ ρ ρ θ ρ ρ ρΨ Ψ Ψ= − Γ ⋅ − − Γ ⋅ Ψ                             (25)   
Clearly, (24) and (25) imply   
                                                            
10
 Quarterly data show that the EA GDP contraction was strongest in 2020q1 (-3.8% quarter on quarter, q-o-q, 
change) and 2020q2 (-11.6%); this was followed by a rebound in 2002q3 (+12.5% q-o-q), but there was a further 
GDP contraction in 2002q4 (-0.7%) due to the second wave of the epidemic in the autumn-winter 2020-21. The q-o-
q changes of the EA GDP deflator were 0.5%, 1.0%, -1.1% and 0.9%, respectively in 2020q1-q4. These q-o-q 
inflation changes suggest that, at the quarterly frequency, aggregate demand and aggregate supply changes were not 
perfectly synchronized, by contrast to the perfect correlation between AD and AS shifts at the annual frequency (see 
below). However, the key stylized fact driving the results of the paper, namely that inflation changes were more 
muted than the massive GDP changes during Covid, also holds in quarterly data. For simplicity, the paper focuses 
on annual data and an annual model calibration. A quarterly model would need to address that the second wave of 
the epidemic was possibly anticipated by households—this might require specifying a richer time series model of 
the Covid shocks than that simple AR(1) processes assumed in the annual calibration.     
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                                                                 00d dθ = Ψ                                                                  (26) 
                                                             and .θρ ρΨ=                                                                     (27) 
Because of the muted effect of Covid on actual inflation in 2020 and on predicted inflation in 
2021, the model infers that the aggregate supply (TFP)  and aggregate demand (discount rate) 
shifts in 2020 induced by Covid had exactly offsetting effects on inflation, and that these shifts 
had the same persistence (autocorrelation). The common autocorrelation of both forcing 
variables will be denoted by .θρ ρ ρΨ≡ =  The subsequent analysis will be based on (26) and (27). 
It is straightforward to see (from (21),(22)) that (26) and (27) are also implied by the model 
variant without ZLB constraint. 
11
 
The notion that EA firms suffered “technological” regress during Covid may seem 
debatable. The negative effect of Covid on aggregate supply can also reflect partial or complete 
government-ordered firm shutdowns (to slow the spread of the virus), or a reduction in 
household labor supply (as workers fear infection while commuting to work or interacting in-
person with co-workers and customers). The latter may be captured by replacing the household’s 
period utility by 1 1/1
1 1/




+− Ξ  where 0tΞ >  is an exogenous shock. Note that a fall in 
tΞ  raises the disutility of labor. It is straightforward to see that a 1% fall in tΞ  and a 1% fall in 
TFP tθ  have identical effects on inflation and GDP. The analysis of the role of TFP shocks for 
the EA macroeconomy during Covid can thus be rephrased in terms of labor supply shifts 
induced by Covid.  
Given the contraction of EA GDP by 7.8% in 2020, the model-inferred estimate of 
Covid-induced TFP and preference shifts in t=0 is, thus:   
                                                   00 7.8%.d dθ = Ψ =−                                                                            
 When (27) holds, then the autocorrelation of GDP is θρ ρ ρΨ≡ =  as can be seen from (18). 
The autocorrelation of GDP responses to Covid thus allows to obtain an estimate of the 
persistence of the Covid-induced aggregate supply and demand shifts. As discussed in Sect.2, 
Covid triggered a -4.7% revision in the predicted level of 2021 GDP, i.e. Covid is predicted to 
                                                            
11 The zero response of the natural real interest rate to the Covid-induced aggregate supply and demand shocks 





have a persistent negative effect on the level of future GDP. The ratio of the predicted 2021 GDP 
contraction to the 2020 GDP contraction is 0.6 ( ( 4.7%) /( 7.8%)).= − −  This suggests that the 
annual autocorrelation of the Covid-induced shift GDP is ρ=0.6. The baseline model calibration 
below thus sets ρ=0.6.   
Note that the estimated GDP autocorrelation ρ=0.6 due to Covid is in the same range, but 
slightly smaller, than the autocorrelation of (detrended) EA GDP in pre-Covid times. The 
autocorrelation of detrended log EA GDP (annual) before Covid (1999-2019) is roughly 0.65.
12
   
 
4.2. Calibrating structural model parameters 
The other model parameters are set at values that are standard in annual macro models. I assume 
 =0.99,β  which implies a 1% per annum steady state riskless real interest rate. The Frisch labor 
supply elasticity is set at unity, 1,η=  a conventional value in macro models. The slope 
coefficient of the Phillips curve (7) is calibrated by exploiting the observational equivalence 
between the linearized Phillips curve under price adjustment costs assumed here (see (4)) and the 
Phillips curve implied by Calvo-type (1983) staggered price setting. Empirical evidence, based 
on quarterly data for the EA, suggests that Calvo-equivalent price stickiness is about 4 quarters, 
i.e. the estimated probability that a firm does not re-optimize its price in a given quarter is about 
0.75 (Kollmann (2001a); Giovannini et al. (2019)). Based on this evidence, I set the Phillips 
curve slope at κ=2.9674, in the present calibration to annual frequency.13  
 
4.3. Simulated shock responses 
Table 2 reports model-predicted impact responses of inflation, GDP and the nominal interest rate 
(R) to a 1% TFP shock and to a 1% preference shock, respectively. Panel (a) shows predicted 
responses in the liquidity trap. Panel (b) shows responses that obtain when the ZLB does not 
bind and the central bank follows a Taylor rule--the inflation coefficient of the interest rate rule 
(19) is set at the conventional value 1.5.πγ =   
                                                            
12  The autocorrelations of linearly detrended, quadratically detrended and HP filtered logged real annual GDP 
(1999-2019) are 0.67, 0.65 and 0.63, respectively.  
13 Under Calvo price setting, the slope of the Phillips curve (4) is (1 )(1 )/ ,w D D Dκ β= − −  where D is the probability 
that an individual firm keeps its price unchanged in a given period. As estimates based on quarterly data suggest 
D=0.75, I set the probability of non-price adjustment at (0.75)4, in the annual model calibration here. This implies 
1.48373.wκ = The assumed labor supply elasticity (η=1) then entails (1 )/  2.9674.wκ κ η η≡ + =    
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 Column 1 of Table 2 shows shock responses under the baseline calibration (shock 
persistence ρ=0.6, 4-quarter Calvo-equivalent price stickiness). Col. (2) assumes less persistent 
shocks, ρ=0.1, while Col. (3) assumes more persistent shocks, ρ=0.9 (Cols. (2),(3) assume 
baseline price stickiness). Col. (4) lowers the Calvo-equivalent price stickiness to two quarters, 
and Col. (5) sets the Calvo-equivalent price stickiness at 8 quarters (while assuming ρ=0.6).    
Away from the ZLB, a Taylor-style monetary policy rule entails that the central bank cuts 
the policy rate, in response to a positive TFP shock, and that it raises the policy rate in response 
to a positive discount rate shock (see Panel (b), Table 2). Away from the ZLB, a positive TFP 
shock lowers inflation, while a positive discount rate shock raises inflation. In all 5 model 
variants, the Taylor-rule-based monetary policy (away from the ZLB) delivers GDP responses to 
TFP shocks that are positive, but slightly smaller than the shock response under flexible prices; 
the GDP response to a positive discount rate shock is positive, but weak. In fact, predicted shock 
responses are close to the response under flexible prices, except when the shock is very transient 
(Col. (3)), or prices are very sticky (Col. (5). (Nota bene: under flexible prices, a 1% TFP 
increase raises GDP by 1%, and a discount rate shock has zero effect on GDP.)  
In the liquidity trap, the interest rate cannot adjust to shocks (Panel (a), Table 2). Under 
the baseline Phillips curve slope κ, the critical value for the shock autocorrelation *ρ  (that is 
decisive for the sign of the inflation response to shocks) is * 0.215ρ =  (see (14),(15)). The 
baseline shock autocorrelation ρ=0.6 thus exceeds the critical persistence *ρ . Under the baseline 
calibration (Col. (1)), the model predicts hence that, in the liquidity trap, a positive TFP shock 
raises inflation and the GDP gap, while a positive discount rate shock lowers inflation and the 
GDP gap. 
However, quantitatively, the response of GDP, in the baseline liquidity trap model 
variant, is relatively similar to the flex-price GDP response: GDP rises by 1.1% in response to 
the TFP shock, and GDP falls by 0.1% in response to the discount rate shock; these responses are 
close to the 1% and 0% responses under flexible prices. The intuition for this is that persistent 
shocks (as assumed in the baseline calibration) have a muted effect on the natural real interest 
rate; those shocks thus have a relatively weak effect on inflation, and hence their effect on GDP 
is close to the flex-price response.  
17 
 
This logic explains why, when shocks are more persistent than in the baseline 
specification (see Col. (3) where ρ=0.9 is assumed), then shock responses are even closer to the 
flex-price responses. As might be expected, the model variant with lower price stickiness too 
generates GDP responses (in the liquidity trap) that are close to the flex-price responses (see Col. 
(4)). By contrast, the GDP response to shocks is magnified -- and it thus differs more from the 
flex-price response -- when greater price stickiness is assumed (Col. (5)). 
14
 The model variant 
with less persistent shocks (see Col. (2) where ρ=0.1 is assumed) is the only model variant in 
Table 2 that deliver qualitatively different inflation and GDP responses than the baseline 
calibration. This is so because *ρ ρ<  holds in Col. (2). In the liquidity trap, a transient TFP 
increase (ρ=0.1) lowers inflation and GDP, while a transient positive discount rate shock gives a 
big boost to inflation and GDP. 
 
4.4. Decomposing the GDP contraction during Covid 
Remarkably, the size of the concomitant model-inferred AD and AS shocks 00 7.8%d dθ = Ψ =−  
that reproduce the 7.8% Covid-induced GDP contraction of 2020, at an unchanged inflation rate, 
is invariant to shock persistence or to other model parameters; it is furthermore common to the 




However, the model-inferred relative contribution of Covid-induced TFP and discount 
rate changes to the GDP contraction, differs across model variants.  
 In all model variants without ZLB constraint, the output contraction is largely attributed 
to the TFP shock. Away from the ZLB, the adverse Covid-induced discount factor shock 
contributes to the fall in GDP, but its influence on GDP is weak. The model variants without 
ZLB constraint predict that if Covid had solely affected aggregate supply, the EA would have 
                                                            
14The critical shock persistence is *( )ρ is 0.0332 in the low-price-stickiness model variant of Col. (4) and 0.4729  in 
the high-price-stickiness case of Col. (5). Thus, *ρ ρ<  holds in Cols. (4) and (5), which explains why the qualitative 
inflation and GDP responses are the same as under the baseline calibration.  
15 This helps to understand why, for all model variants, the sum of the inflation responses to a 1% TFP shock and to 
a 1% preference shock is 0, while the sum of the GDP responses to both shocks is 1%, as can be seen in Table 2. For 
example, in the baseline liquidity trap model version, a 1% TFP shock raises GDP by 1.1%, while a 1% preference 




experienced a sharp rise in inflation and a contraction in GDP that would have been smaller than 
the actual contraction. 
In the baseline liquidity trap model, the Covid-induced GDP change too is largely driven 
by the TFP shock; the simultaneous discount rate shock counterbalances the TFP-induced GDP 
change, but again the effect of the discount rate shock on GDP is weak. The role of the TFP 
shock is especially strong when prices are very sticky (Col. (5)). The only liquidity trap model 
variant in which the GDP change is driven by the discount rate shock is the variant with very 
transitory shocks; see Col. (2) in Table 2. The simulations in Table 2 indicate thus that, for 
empirically plausible persistence of the Covid-induced AD and AS shifts, the effect of the AS 
shifts on GDP dominates clearly, in a liquidity trap.  
The analysis here suggests, hence, that the Covid-induced GDP contraction was largely 
due to the adverse effect of Covid on aggregate supply. However, aggregate supply and demand 
shifts both mattered equally for the observed stability of inflation under Covid.   
In a liquidity trap, persistent adverse AS shifts tend to lower inflation, while adverse 
demand shifts raise inflation. The liquidity trap model predicts that, if Covid had solely affected 
aggregate supply, the EA would have experienced a sharp fall in inflation and a contraction in 
GDP that would have been deeper than the actual contraction; the contraction in aggregate 
demand thus had a partially stabilizing effect on EA GDP, during Covid.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the macroeconomic effects of the Covid-19 epidemic on Euro Area 
(EA) GDP and inflation, using a stylized New Keynesian model. Offsetting aggregate demand 
and supply changes are shown to account for the stability of EA inflation, in the face of Covid. 
The evidence presented here indicates that Covid-induced aggregate demand and supply shifts 
were persistent. An aggregate supply contraction is identified as the dominant force driving the 
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Table 1. Euro Area macroeconomic performance, 2019-2021 (predicted and actual) 
  Forecast  Forecast error Forecast revision 
                Forecast 11/2019    05/2021        Actual                     11/2019            05/2021-11/2019            
 2019 2020 2021 2021 2019 2020 2019 2020 2021 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Y 1.1 1.2 1.2 4.3 1.3 -6.6 0.2 -7.8 3.1  
C 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.7 1.3 -8.0 0.2 -9.2 1.5 
G 1.6 1.5 1.3 3.8 1.8 1.3 0.2 -0.2 2.5 
I 4.3 2.0 1.9 6.7 5.7 -8.2 1.4 -10.2 4.8 
NX/Y 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.4 3.0 3.4 -0.1 0.6 0.7 
L 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.2 -1.6 0.1 -2.1 -0.5 
Y/L 0.0 0.7 0.7 4.3 0.1 -5.0 0.1 -5.7 3.6  
π 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.5 0.2 0.0 -0.3  
 
 
Notes:  Forecasted and realized year-on-year growth rates of 2019-2021 Euro Area (EA) real GDP 
(Y), private consumption (C), government consumption (G), investment (I), employment (L) and 
labor productivity (Y/L) are shown as well as the forecasted and realized GDP deflator (π) and next 
exports/GDP ratio (NX/Y). (Net exports pertain to the merchandise trade.) Growth rates are in 
percent (%); inflation and the NX/Y ratio are in percentage points (ppt).   
Cols. (1)-(3) are predictions for 2019-2021 taken from the European Commission’s (EC) 
Economic Forecast November 2019. (Statistics for 2019 shown in Col. (1) are predictions, as these 
statistics were published before the end of 2019.)  
Col. (4) shows predictions for 2021 taken from the EC May 2021 Economic Forecast. 
Cols. (5),(6) show actual (realized) variables for 2019 and 2020, respectively (as reported in the 
EC May 2021 Economic Forecast). 
Cols. (7),(8) show the difference between actual variables in 2019 and 2020 and the corresponding 
EC predictions made in Nov. 2019. [Col.(7) = Col.(5)-Col.(1);  Col.(8) = Col.(6)-Col.(2)] 
Col. (9) shows forecast revisions, between Nov. 2019 and May 2021 EC forecasts, for 2021 
variables. [Col.(9)=Col.(4)-Col.(3)]. 
















Table 2. Model-predicted impact responses to 1% TFP (θ) and preference (Ψ) shocks 
  
 
  Less More Less More 
  persistent persistent           sticky sticky 
 Baseline shocks shocks prices prices 
 ρ=0.6 ρ=0.1            ρ=0.9         ρ=0.6 ρ=0.6 
 κ=2.96               κ=2.96          κ=2.96              κ=28.14           κ=0.59 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(a) Liquidity trap 
1% TFP increase 
Π 0.72 -5.14 0.11 0.66 1.21 
Y 1.10 -0.58 1.00 1.01 1.84  
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
1% preference shock  
Π -0.72 5.14 -0.11 -0.66 -1.21  
Y -0.10 1.58 0.00 -0.01 -0.84  
R  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(b) Away from ZLB (Taylor rule) 
1% TFP increase 
Π -0.41 -0.53 -0.16 -0.44 -0.34   
Y 0.94 0.84 0.99 0.99 0.77 
R -0.61 -0.80 -0.24 -0.66 -0.51    
 
1% preference shock 
Π 0.41 0.53 0.16 0.44 0.34  
Y 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.23 
R 0.61 0.80 0.24 0.66 0.51 
 
 
Notes: Impact responses of inflation (Π), GDP (Y) and the nominal interest rate (R) to 1% innovations 
to TFP (θ) and to the preference shifter (Ψ) are shown. Responses of GDP are expressed in %; responses 
of inflation and interest rate are in percentage points (ppt). Responses pertain to annual variables.  
ρ: autocorrelation of shocks; κ: slope of Phillips curve.  
 Panel (a) shows responses in a permanent liquidity trap; Panel (b) shows responses when the ZLB does 
not bind and the central bank follows a Taylor rule.  
Col. (1): baseline calibration (ρ=0.6 and 4-quarter Calvo-equivalent price stickiness). 
Cols. (2),(3): less persistent shocks (ρ=0.1) and more persistent shocks (ρ=0.9), respectively, than in 
baseline (same price stickiness as in baseline).  
Cols. (4),(5):  prices less sticky (2-quarter Calvo-equivalent) and more sticky (8-quarter Calvo-
equivalent), respectively, than in baseline (same shock autocorrelation as in baseline).   
